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NOTE
RESORT TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW IN CHALLENGING
CONDITIONS IN U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION CENTERS
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are
caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a sin-
gle garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects
all indirectly.... Anyone who lives inside the United States
can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its
bounds.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Those words, written by the late Martin Luther King, Jr.,
had deep meaning for the 1960s civil rights movement. They
have equally deep meaning to people locked away in immigra-
tion detention centers2 throughout the United States, waiting
for their ticket to freedom, especially for someone like Edwin
Bulus. He fled to the United States "to escape torture at the
hands of Nigeria's military dictatorship after his brother was
charged with treason for plotting a coup."3 Instead of finding
freedom, Edwin Bulus was deprived of the liberty he so desper-
ately sought, being detained by immigration authorities in a
county jail.4 During his detention, Edwin suffered abuse at the
hands of guards. They "stomped on him, forced him to kneel
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE
CAN'T WArT 76, 77 (1964).
2. Other terms include "immigration jails," "processing centers," "refugee
camps," or "holding centers."
3. Celia W. Dugger, After a 'Kafkaesque' Ordeal, Seeker of Asylum Presses
Case, N.Y. TIIES, Apr. 1, 1997, at Al.
4. See id.
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naked for hours, pushed his head in a toilet, left him to sleep
naked on a bare mattress and subjected him to racist invec-
tive."5 Edwin said the treatment "was typical of the military
brutality" in his country, and that he could not "believe it hap-
pened in the United States,"6 a place he thought was a
human-rights-loving country. Like Edwin Bulus, detainees in
U.S. immigration detention centers fled their former countries,
escaping torture, mutilation, oppression, persecution, and mur-
der. And, like Edwin Bulus, they have not found freedom in
the United States. Upon their arrival at U.S. borders they
were promptly escorted to an immigration jail, as though they
had committed a crime in preserving their lives. They are
locked away for months, even years, until their asylum claims
are processed. During their jail stays they endure squalid con-
ditions and inhumane treatment. Such conditions include lack
of fresh air and sunlight, overcrowding, unsanitary living quar-
ters, inadequate medical care, limited access to legal counsel,
and denial of reasonable access to exercise and recreation.7
Reports of inhumane treatment include shackling detainees'
arms and legs, solitary confinement, and physical, sexual, and
verbal abuse.8
Immigration policy in the United States has received wide-
spread attention over the last two decades, sparked by the
influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees. Prior to the Reagan-
Bush era, the general policy was to parole (release) asylum
seekers, with or without bond, until their status could be de-
termined.9 During the Reagan-Bush era, however, detention
became the rule.'0 Many have argued that such a rule is arbi-
trary, unnecessary, and in violation of U.S. constitutional prin-
ciples.1" For the most part, legal challenges involving asylum
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B for a more detailed account of conditions in
immigration jails.
8. See discussion infra Part II.B.
9. See IM1IGRANT' RIGHTS PROJECT, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, JUS-
TICE DETAINED: CONDITIONS AT THE VARICK STREET IMMIGRATION DETENTION CEN-
TER 1-3 (1993) [hereinafter ACLU REPORT].
10. See infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
11. See, e.g., Maurice A. Roberts, Some Thoughts on the Wanton Detention of
Aliens, 5 GEo. IMmIGR. L.J. 225 (1991); Mark D. Kemple, Note, Legal Fictions
Mask Human Suffering: The Detention of the Mariel Cubans: Constitutional, Statu-
tory, International Law, and Human Considerations, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735
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seekers attack the legality of detention itself. The constitution-
ality of the practice notwithstanding, detention has now be-
come a harsh reality. Thus, this Note does not focus on the
legality or arbitrary nature of detention itself. Rather, it ad-
dresses the human rights violations inflicted on detainees.
Past and present practices by the United States in itsimmigration detention centers ignore respect for human digni-
ty, the very basis of international human rights standards, 2
and violate the principle that prohibits cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment. 3 Whatever reason the U.S. government
uses to justify its current immigration policy, whether it be
overwhelming numbers of immigrants or an inability to pro-
cess claims swiftly, there is no justification for treating
detainees as anything less than human beings.
If the United States is to satisfy international human
rights standards, it is required, at a minimum, to refrain from
continuing its practices with respect to detainees. At best, the
United States is required actively to provide a standard for
alien detainees that conforms to international human rights
norms. The first step in achieving international peace is the
recognition and respect for basic human dignity. Only through
respect for human dignity and fundamental human rights will
the United States be able to claim that it has joined in the
(1989); Deborah M. Levy, Detention in the Asylum Context, 44 U. PITt. L. REV.
297 (1983); Note, The Indefinite Detention of Excluded Aliens: Statutory and Con-
stitutional Justifications and Limitations, 82 MICH. L. REV. 61 (1983).
12. For example, the U.N. Charter reaffirms "faith in fundamental human
rights" and the "dignity and worth of the human person." U.N. CHARTER preamble,
para. 2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes "the inherent dig-
nity ... of all members of the human family" as the "foundation of freedom,
justice and peace in the world." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pt. 1, 183d plen. mtg., preamble, para. 1, at 71, U.N.
Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
13. See Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 5, at 73; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 7, SEN. EXEC. DOC.
E, 95-2, at 23, 25 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 175 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPRI; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, done Nov. 4, 1950, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224 (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention]; American Convention
on Human Rights, done Nov. 22, 1969, art. 5(2), SEN. ExEc. Doc. F, 95-2, at 41
(1978), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146 (entered into force July 18, 1978) [hereinafter
American Convention]; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, art. 16, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 23 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1031 [hereinafter Torture
Convention].
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quest for true international peace.
Part II of this Note discusses U.S. immigration detention
policy since the Reagan-Bush era, and describes detention
facility conditions in the United States during and since that
era. Against that backdrop, Part III discusses existing interna-
tional human rights standards, their binding force under inter-
national law, and their status in domestic courts. Part IV dis-
cusses the rights of alien detainees in challenging their deten-
tion conditions under international human rights law, and
analyzes the scope and definition of those rights. This Note
concludes by calling upon the judiciary to implement interna-
tional law in this arena. Perhaps through the recognition and
implementation of international law, inhumane conditions in
immigration jails will come to an end, and people like Edwin
Bulus will finally be treated as human beings.
II. BACKGROUND
Modern refugee law has developed from the international
community's response to the mass exoduses and involuntary
migrations of the two world wars. 4 It reflects, on the one
hand, the collective humanitarian commitment of states to
protect those who are persecuted and forced to flee their coun-
tries of origin, while also protecting states' individual interests
of sovereignty and immigration control. 5 Principally, the in-
ternational community affords protection to refugees through
the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees" (Refugee
Convention), which defines a refugee as:
any person who... owing to well-founded fear of being per-
secuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country .... 17
14. See generally James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying
Premise of Refugee Law, 31 HARV. INVL L.J. 129 (1990).
15. See id. at 133.
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
17. Id. art. 1(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. at 6261, 189 U.N.T.S. at 152. The United States
acceded to the Refugee Convention by signing and ratifying the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [here-
inafter Refugee Protocol]. The Protocol's main objective was to remove the tempo-
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Nonrefoulement-the right not to be returned to a country
where a refugee will be persecuted-is one of the fundamental
rights protected by refugee law.'" Under article 33(1) of the
Refugee Convention and its Protocol:
No Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refu-
gee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of
his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. 9
The right of nonrefoulement is so fundamental that "[e]ven
before the receiving country grants formal refugee status.., a
person claiming to flee persecution is protected ... ."" Ac-
cordingly, if an individual satisfies the elements of the defini-
tion of a refugee, "he or she is clearly entitled to the
protections afforded" by the Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Refugee Protocol).2
Notwithstanding the collective commitment to protect
refugees, individual states have focused on their own self-inter-
ests in maintaining sovereignty and in stemming the flow of
mass immigration across their borders." One commentator
observed this dichotomy by stating:
[N]o national right is more zealously guarded than the
sovereign's right to control its borders; nor is any moral prin-
ciple more vehemently advocated than the human-rights-
based insistence that foreign nationals fleeing life-threaten-
ing conditions in their homelands be provided refuge in
neighboring countries.'
ral and geographical limitations contained in the Refugee Convention's definition of
refugee. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at 130 n.6.
18. See Arthur C. Helton, The Mandate of U.S. Courts to Protect Aliens and
Refugees Under International Human Rights Law, 100 YALE L.J. 2335, 2342
(1991).
19. Refugee Convention, supra note 16, art. 33(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6276, 189
U.N.T.S. at 176; Refugee Protocol, supra note 17, art. 1(1), 19 U.S.T. at 6225, 606
U.N.T.S. at 268.
20. Helton, supra note 18, at 2342.
21. Id.
22. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at, 166. Hathaway argues that refugee law
reflects neither humanitarian nor human rights concerns, but rather is a means of
governing international migration for the benefit of state interests. Id.
23. Katherine L. Vaughns, Taming the Asylum Adjudication Process: An Agen-
da for the Twenty-First Century, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3 (1993); see Bill
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Indeed, the primacy of state interest is reflected in the Refugee
Convention's protection scheme, where the implementation of
refugee protection procedures and status determination is
placed exclusively in the hands of the individual states.24
A. Immigration and Alien Detention Policy in the United
States
Immigration policy in the United States clearly demon-
strates the dichotomy between humanitarian concerns and
national self-interests. By enacting the Refugee Act of 1980,25
the United States reiterated its humanitarian commitment to
the protection of refugees and formally implemented into do-
mestic law its obligations under the Refugee Protocol.26 At the
same time, however, the United States protects its own inter-
ests through a comprehensive immigration policy, which in-
cludes a discretionary scheme of providing asylum for refugees
and detention of aliens seeking to enter the United States,
despite their refugee status.
Refugees reaching U.S. borders are afforded some initial
protection through the principle of nonrefoulement. The Immi-
gration and Nationality Act (INA)27 prohibits the Attorney
General from deporting or returning an alien to a country
where "such alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such
country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion."" However, in
order to receive permanent protection, the refugee must satisfy
the statutory framework established for granting asylum. 29
In order to receive asylum in the United States, an alien
must first satisfy the INA's definition of a refugee, which is
any person who is outside any country of such person's na-
tionality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is
Coffinan, Comment, Organizational Membership and Political Opinion as Grounds
for Refugee Status, 18 HOuS. J. INT'L L. 465, 466 (1996).
24. See Hathaway, supra note 14, at 166.
25. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980)(codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 & 22 U.S.C.). This act was the first comprehensive legislation that
exclusively addressed the reception of refugees and bound the United States to the
Refugee Convention. See Coffman, supra note 23, at 471.
26. See Coffinan, supra note 23, at 471.
27. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1524 (1994).
28. Id. § 1253(h)(1).
29. See id. § 1158(a).
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outside any country in which such person last habitually
resided, and who is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecu-
tion or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion."
Meeting the definition of refugee does not automatically entitle
an alien to asylum, however, since the alien must apply for
asylum and the decision to grant asylum is discretionary in the
Attorney General.3 While an alien's asylum application is
pending, he or she is likely to be detained by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS).
The detention policy that emerged in the early 1950s was
to detain as few aliens as possible. "IBloth excludable and
deportable aliens were presumptively eligible for release and
could be detained only if [they] pose[d] a security risk or a risk
of absconding."33 All others were released on bond or supervi-
sion.34 The practice of releasing aliens was embraced by the
Supreme Court in Leng May Ma v. Barber:5
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device
30. Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
31. Section 1158 states:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irre-
spective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of
section 101(a)(42)(A) of [Title 8].
Id. § 1158(a) (emphasis added).
32. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 229. Roberts notes:
This policy ultimately led to the closing in 1954 of Ellis Island and later
of other INS detention stations in other parts of the country. As part of
this policy of nondetention, it became the standard practice to start de-
portation proceedings by issuing an order to show cause and serving it
on the alien without taking him or her into actual custody under a war-
rant of arrest.
Id.
33. ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
34. See id. The Refugee Act of 1980 permits the Attorney General, in her
discretion, to parole any alien applying for admission. Refugee Act of 1980
§ 203(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) (1994). "Parole" in this context refers to the
release of aliens, and does not refer to parole as commonly used in the criminal
context.
35. 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
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through which needless confinement is avoided while admin-
istrative proceedings are conducted .... Physical detention
of aliens is now the exception, not the rule, and is generally
employed only as to security risks or those likely to abscond.
Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an en-
lightened civilization."
This policy continued until 1980, when the United States
was faced with an influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees.37 To
stem the flow of mass immigration and to deter illegal immi-
gration, the INS adopted new regulations that required deten-
tion of aliens who could not present a valid claim for admis-
sion.8 Under current construction, the INS will detain any
alien who "appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible,
and who arrives without documents... or who arrives with
documentation which appears on its face to be false, altered, or
to relate to another person, or who arrives at a place other
than a designated port of entry...."39
Since the 1980s, detention has become the rule, and parole
is the exception, resulting in mandatory detention for individu-
als previously eligible for release." The Attorney General has
discretionary authority to parole certain classes of aliens, in-
cluding those "whose continued detention is not in the public
interest, as determined by the district director."4' However,
the INS has indicated that the parole power is to be used re-
strictively.4"
In 1990, the INS implemented a pilot project allowing for
release of aliens who had credible claims to asylum and who
could meet certain criteria.43 Following the conclusion of the
36. Id. at 190 (citation omitted); see Levy, supra note 11, at 305.
37. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
38. See Levy, supra note 11, at 305.
39. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b) (1996).
40. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 3.
41. 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(a)(2)(v).
42. See Letter from Warren A. Lewis, District Director, INS, to Jeffrey A.
Heller, Esq. 2 (Apr. 15, 1995) (responding to request for release of detainee pend-
ing exclusion proceedings) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law)
[hereinafter Lewis Letter]. The letter states: "The legislative history of the parole
provision shows that it is the congressional intent that parole be used in a restric-
tive manner." Id.
43. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 4 n.16. Such criteria include: not pre-
senting a threat to public safety, having a place to live, a lawyer, and a job or
means of support. Id.
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pilot program in 1991, then-INS Commissioner Gene McNary
issued a memorandum reimplementing the project in 1992."
Nevertheless, the INS continues its mandatory detention poli-
cy,45 even though parole does not change the alien's legal sta-
tus as excludable.46 Consequently, refugees sit in immigration
jails indefinitely until their claims are processed.47
Detention is used as a means to deter immigration.4' For
example, one INS deputy director claimed that detention is
necessary because most asylum claims are without merit.49 A
newspaper reporter noted that the official defended detention
because it "sends a message worldwide that would-be immi-
grants can't just come to the United States and 'automatically
wander the streets."'50 A former INS Commissioner said "the
harsh [detention] policy would send a message that immi-
grants would be held in conditions that won't be like the Ritz-
Carlton."5 Maurice C. Inman, Jr., general counsel to the INS
in 1986, claimed that "[tihese people by rights should be in
44. See Memorandum from Gene McNary, Commissioner, INS, to All Regional
Administrators et al. (Apr. 20, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law). Under the new program, the release criteria to be met included deter-
mining that: (1) the person's true identity has been ascertained, to a reasonable
degree of certainty; (2) the asylum claim appears credible; (3) the person does not
pose a threat to the community; (4) the person has legal representation or a place
to live and means of support; and (5) the person agrees to stay in contact with
the INS, appear for all hearings, and appear for deportation, if ultimately deemed
excluded. See id. at 2-3. Additionally, the memo provides that the interviewer shall
recommend parole if the criteria is met and the person does not present an un-
usually strong risk of absconding. Even in cases where a strong risk of absconding
is present, or some of the criteria are not met, the person may be released on
bond. Id. at 3.
45. See Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Con-
finement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 1087, 1109 & n.113 (1995).
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1994); ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 3;.
Kemple, supra note 11, at 1736; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (alien permitted entry pending a decision on admissibility is
treated "as if stopped at the border").
47. See ACLU REPORT, supra note 9, at 3. If they are not admitted entry
after their exclusion hearing, they are indefinitely detained pending deportation.
See id.
48. See id.
49. See Elizabeth Llorente, Shackled in the Land of Hope; Asylum Seekers
Held for Months, BERGEN RECORD (N.J.), Mar. 12, 1995, at Al, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Njrec File.
50. Id. (quoting Bill Tillman, Deputy Director, INS, Newark, N.J.).
51. Alisa Solomon, Yearning to Breath Free, VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 8, 1995, at
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jail, ... [t]hey are here illegally,... [tihey are not worthy of
much sympathy."52 In response to growing demands that ille-
gal aliens were taking away job opportunities from U.S. citi-
zens,53 bills were introduced in Congress to sanction employ-
ers who knowingly hired undocumented aliens.54 The INS also
imposed bond conditions, requiring that aliens agree not to
accept any employment unless authorized by the INS.55
The INS claims its policy of deterrence has worked, by
decreasing the number of attempted illegal entries significantly
from 1992 to 1994."6 Coupled with anti-immigrant sentiment
in the United States,57 the INS policy of detention sends a
message to immigrants that the United States really does not
want them here, and if they come, they will be subject to indef-
inite detention. Consequently, "[tihe detention policy has
caused extreme hardship to thousands of innocent asylum
applicants," and "[tihe policy actually has punished those 'op-
pressed of other nations' whom Congress sought to welcome
with the Refugee Act of 1980.""8
The U.S. policy of detaining aliens is in dire need of re-
form. Until such reform can be accomplished, however, the
conditions under which detainees live need even more serious
attention.
B. Conditions in U.S. Immigration Detention Centers
The INS uses a number of types of detention facilities.
Those operated by the INS directly are called "Service Process-
ing Centers" (SPCs).59 The INS also makes use of state, coun-
ty, and local jails to detain aliens, as well as "contract facili-
ties," which are operated for the INS by private corpora-
tions."
52. Bob Drogin, To This Illegal Alien It's a New Kind of 'Freedom Fight', L.A.
TnMES, June 26, 1986, pt. 1, at 22.
53. See Roberts, supra note 11, at 229.
54. See id. at 229-30.
55. See id. at 230.
56. See Solomon, supra note 51, at 27.
57. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. XXVIII, §§ 1-2 (English-only provisions); Propo-
sition 187, 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. No. 6, at A-78 (West).
58. Arthur C. Helton, Refugees: An Agenda for Reform, in HUMIAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 49, 58 (Louis Henkin & John Lawrence Hargrove
eds., 1994).




A contract facility located in Elizabeth, New Jersey, run by
a private corporation, ESMOR Inc. (Esmor), was the subject of
a recent investigation by the INS.6 The reports of abuses at
that facility are shattering:
* Immigration lawyers complained that during inter-
views, their clients were chained to steel tables, with
both legs shackled. Esmor claimed the practice was
necessary because there were not enough guards on
duty.62
* Detainees complained of physical and verbal abuse,
including racial slurs by guards, blazing lights in the
middle of the night, limited exercise and no fresh
air.63
* Detainees are awakened repeatedly in the middle of
the night, and often arbitrarily placed in isolation.'
* Joyce Phipps, a Seton Hall law professor witnessed a
guard slam a detainee against a wall. She also alleged
that detainees did not receive proper medical care and
have limited access to their attorneys.65
* One detainee indicated that in the seven months that
she was there, she was never outdoors, that she lived
in dirty clothes, on insect-infested beds.
66
* The detainees are housed in crowded dormitories.
Visits from immediate family are limited, food is
sparse and inedible. Detainees are given only facility-
issue orange jumpsuits and two pairs of underwear,
which are changed once each week.
* One Sudanese detainee complained that she was ig-
nored or dismissed by guards when she asked for help.
61. See IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ASSESSMENT TEAM, THE
ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY CONTRACT DETENTION FACILITY OPERATED BY ESMOR
INC.: INTERIM REPORT (July 20, 1995) [hereinafter INS INTERIM REPORT] (on file
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
62. See Ashley Dunn, Harsh Criticism of Detention Center, N.Y. TIMES, June
19, 1995, at B5.
63. See Richard Prez-Pefia, Illegal Aliens Overrun a Jail in New Jersey, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1995, at Al.
64. See Ashley Dunn, U.S. Inquiry Finds Detention Center Was Poorly Run,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1995, at Al.
65. See Maureen Castellano, INS to Probe Conditions at Private Jails for
Aliens, N.J. L.J., June 12, 1995, at 5, 17.
66. See Pbrez-Pefia, supra note 63, at B5.
67. See Castellano, supra note 65, at 17.
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Unable to get soap, she bathed with liquid laundry
detergent. The Esmor staff forbade her to wear her
own underwear and they gave her other detainees'
used underpants, which often bore old menstrual
stains.68
* Guards denied the detainees basic toiletries, gave
women men's underwear with question marks drawn
on the crotch, and refused to give women sanitary
pads.69
In November 1994, the detainees staged a hunger strike,
which was dismissed as a minor incident by the INS.7" On the
windows of the detention center, the detainees wrote messages
about inhumane conditions.7 On June 18, 1995, a number of
the detainees staged an uprising, protesting the inhumane
conditions.72 After the uprising, the detainees were relocated
to other facilities or to county and federal jails.73 They had
their wrists shackled behind their backs for eighteen hours,
and they were deprived of food, water, and sanitary facili-
ties. 4 Some detainees said they were beaten during the trans-
fer, stripped naked, and forced to sleep on the floor.7" The in-
cident prompted an investigation by the INS, which confirmed
the reports and allegations of abuse. 6
The report by the INS Assessment Team investigating the
matter discovered that "detainees were subjected to harass-
ment, verbal abuse, and other degrading actions perpetrated
by some ESMOR guards,"77 and that the complaints were
credible.7" The report states that "the evidence suggests that
these incidents were part of a systematic methodology designed
by some ESMOR guards as a means to control the general
detainee population and to intimidate and discipline obstreper-
68. Elizabeth Llorente, At Esmor, the Reign of Terror is Over, BERGEN RECORD
(N.J.), July 30, 1995, Rev. & Outlook sec., at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Njrec File.
69. See id.
70. See Llorente, supra note 49.
71. See id.
72. See Pfrez-Pefia, supra note 63, at Al; Solomon, supra note 51, at 25.
73. See Solomon, supra note 51, at 25.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 26.
76. See INS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 61, at 6.
77. Id. at 5. -
78. See id. at 6.
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ous detainees through the use of corporal punishment."79
From a confidential interview with a guard, the INS Assess-
ment Team learned that "placement of detainees into segrega-
tion without a charging document was a frequent occurrence"
and that "the segregation unit was used as a means both of
punishing detainees for relatively minor offenses, and for more
general harassment."8" As a result of the report and com-
plaints from attorneys and human rights organizations, INS
Commissioner Doris Meissner closed the detention center.8
The recent accounts of abuses are not new to the system.
Extremely poor conditions were reported to exist at the Atlanta
Penitentiary, which housed Cubans who arrived from Mariel
Harbor in the "freedom flotilla" boatlift" The jail was over-
crowded, housing groups of eight in a 210 square foot cell de-
signed for four men, allowing only a twenty-eight square foot
area for each man to live in.83 The jail also had a history of
violence. Between 1982 and 1987 there were "seven successful
suicides, 158 suicide attempts, 2,000 incidents of serious self-
mutilation, 4,000 episodes of self-mutilation, and nine homi-
cides,"' all explainable as detainees' responses to frustration
over indefinite detention. Other conditions that were noted
included substandard ventilation and lighting, and inadequate
changes of clothing, underwear and towels." In 1986, a Con-
gressional Committee issued a report on the conditions in the
Atlanta facility, stating that those conditions were "brutal,"
"inhumane," and "intolerable."86
Reports by former guards at the Port Isabel SPC in Los
Fresnos, Texas, included allegations that: (1) supervisors and
other personnel were sexually molesting female detainees; (2)
supervisors would take young women from their sleeping quar-
ters late at night, bring them out to the parking lot, and take
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 8.
81. See Llorente, supra note 68.
82. See Kemple, supra note 11, at 1735. In the spring of 1980, approximately
125,000 Cubans fled Cuba by small boats and sailed to U.S. shores. See id. Presi-
dent Carter called for an orderly, safe, and humane evacuation process and or-
dered the Coast Guard to assist those at sea. See id. at 1735 n.2.
83. See id. at 1741.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1741 n.32.
86. See id. at 1741.
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them into their cars; and (3) a former guard was required to
escort a sixteen year-old girl from her sleeping quarters to the
offices of supervisors, where the girl would be forced to dance
for the supervisors in exchange for their promises to help her
get out of the SPC.87 The reports prompted an investigation
by the Office of the Inspector General, which found the allega-
tions unsubstantiated.' However, former guards indicated
that they had been threatened with the loss of their jobs if
they spoke to investigators. 9 Guards at the detention center
had been trained to lack empathy. They were told not to talk
to detainees, not even to joke or smile." When former guards
helped a female detainee who was fainting and spitting up
blood, an immigration officer chastised them, accused the de-
tainee of malingering, and kicked her. She died that night. 1
At the Krome Avenue detention facility near Miami, Hai-
tian detainees were surrounded by three rows of chain-linked
fence topped with barbed wire, and supervised by armed
guards.9" Sanitary conditions were primitive, with water pres-
sure so low that detainees had resorted to showering in the
urinals.93 After months of confinement, many developed symp-
toms of depression; there were at least twenty-nine suicide
attempts among the detainees. Others complained of blinding
headaches, stomach cramps, and other illnesses.94
In 1993, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is-
sued a report condemning conditions at an immigration deten-
tion facility on Varick Street in Manhattan.95 Among the
problems cited were: (1) repeated citation of the staff for mis-
conduct and failure to meet minimal standards; (2) abusive
treatment by guards ranging from verbal .harassment to physi-
cal abuse; (3) lack of access to counsel and the courts; and (4)
inhumane living conditions, including overcrowding, unsani-
tary conditions, lack of fresh air and sunlight, inadequate exer-
87. See Solomon, supra note 51, at 28.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 29.
91. See id.
92. See Peter McGrath et al., Refugees or Prisoners?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 1, 1982,
at 24, 25.
93. See id.
94. See Janice Castro, For 1,800 Haitians-Freedom, TIME, July 26, 1982, at
95. See generally ACLU REPORT, supra note 9.
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cise and recreation, arbitrary use of segregation, lack of ade-
quate medical care, and restrictive visitation policies. 6 The
ACLU furnished its findings to the INS before publishing the
report. 7 The INS, however, did not offer a response to the re-
port.9
8
It is evident from the above accounts that poor conditions
are systemic in detention centers throughout the United
States. These conditions are violative of basic human rights,
specifically the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment, as recognized under customary international
law and codified by a number of human rights treaties.
III. INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS
A. Background
International human rights law has developed significant-
ly since World War II, stimulated by the atrocities perpetrated
by the Nazis against millions of people. The Nazis' acts were
carried out with little interference from other nations.99 The
war and the Holocaust demonstrated that "unfettered sover-
eignty could not exist without untold suffering and.., the
danger of destroying ... human society."' 0  Hence, the
founders of the United Nations decided to make promotion of
human rights a prominent aim of the new world organiza-
tion.'O° The notion of human rights received formal recog-
nition in the U.N. Charter,' which states:
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity
and worth of the human person ...
96. See id. at 12-51.
97. See id. at 7.
98. See id.
99. See FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUmiN RIGHTS
1 (1990).
100. Id.
101. See J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CON-
VENTION AGAINST TORTURE 5 (1988).
102. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
103. Id. (emphasis added).
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The concern for human rights is given normative expression in
article 55 of the U.N. Charter, which provides that the United
Nations shall promote "universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." °4 Article 56
provides that "[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint
and separate action in co-operation with the [U.N.] Organiza-
tion for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article
55.
"105
The U.N. Charter authorized the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), one of the principal organs of the United
Nations, to promote "respect for, and observance of, human
rights and fundamental freedoms for all."' Pursuant to its
authority, the ECOSOC established the Commission on Hu-
man Rights in 1946.07
The Commission's first assignment was the preparation of
an "International Bill of Rights."' The International Bill of
Rights was conceived in concert with the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (Universal Declaration),0 9 which defines
the notion of human rights concerned, and two basic trea-
ties-the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),"' and the International Covenant on Economic, So-
cial and Cultural Rightsm---which mandate that States are
legally obligated to guard their citizens' human rights and also
construct an international system for ensuring the implemen-
tation of States' obligations."'
In addition to the International Bill of Rights, there are
three regional treaties that promote and protect human rights:
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms,"' the American Convention on
104. Id. art. 55; see also M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xxiii (1994).
105. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
106. Id. art. 62(2).
107. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 6.
108. See id.
109. Universal Declaration, supra note 12.
110. ICCPR, supra note 13, SEN. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at
171.
111. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
112. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 6.
113. European Convention, supra note 13.
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Human Rights,"4 and the Banjul Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights." 5 There also exist numerous instruments on
special subjects in the field of human rights."6
Among the specific rights set forth in the International
Bill of Rights and the other regional7 conventions is the prohibi-
tion against torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment. As one author has noted, "[a]fter the end of the
eighteenth century torture acquired a universally pejorative
association and came to be considered the institutional antithe-
sis of human rights .... 1
Nonetheless, torture was used by totalitarian regimes
between the First and Second World Wars as a means of ex-
tracting confessions and spreading terror." These regimes
also inflicted other forms of inhumane treatment upon their
prisoners."' With the formation of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration explicitly prohibited such practices. 2 °
It states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."2' Similar
provisions are included in the other major conventions.'22
This principle has attained jus cogens status,2 ' and all the
major conventions (except the Banjul Charter) prohibit deroga-
tion, even in times of war, public danger, or other emergency
that threatens the security of the nation.'24 Alien detainees
114. American Convention, supra note 13.
115. Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 27, 1981,
O.A.U. Doc. CABILEG/67/3/Rev.5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Banjul
Charter].
116. See BURGERS & DANELUS, supra note 101, at 7.
117. EDWARD PETERS, TORTURE 75 (1985).
118. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 10.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 11.
121. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 5.
122. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7, SEN. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 25,
999 U.N.T.S. at 175; European Convention, supra note 13, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at
224; American Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(2), SEN. EXEC. Doc. F, 95-2, at
42, 1144 U.N.T.S. at 146; Banjul Charter, supra note 115, art. 5, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. at 60.
123. See Preliminary Report by the Special Representative of the Commission on
the Human Rights Situation in the Islamic Republic of Iran, U.N. ESCOR Comm'n
on Hum. Rts., 41st Sess., Agenda Item 12, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/20 (1985)
[hereinafter Preliminary Report]; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 12.
124. See ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 4, SEN. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2, at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174; European Convention, supra note 13, art. 15(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at
232; American Convention, supra note 13, art. 27, SEN. EXEC. DOC. F, 95-2, at 49,
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will invoke this norm in challenging their detention conditions.
B. Binding Force of Treaties, Declarations, and Customary
International Law
As a source of international law,'25 treaties or conven-
tions are distinguishable from declarations or resolutions in
that they contain legally binding obligations on those states
that have become parties to them.2 ' Where a State has
signed but not ratified a treaty, it is obliged to refrain from
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the trea-
ty.'27 Moreover, under the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
States are obliged to keep their promises. 2 '
Customary international law consists of unwritten laws,
and is established by acts of States that are consistent, repeti-
tious, and undertaken with a conscious sense of a legal obliga-
tion to follow a certain practice (opinio juris).'29 Once a State
practice reaches a consensus to which states feel legally obli-
gated, a binding norm exists.' It is a generally accepted
view that customary international law is binding on all na-
tions, provided they have not expressly and persistently object-
ed to the norm's development.'3 '
The Universal Declaration, adopted as a U.N. General
Assembly resolution, has no formal legally binding effect per
1144 U.N.T.S. at 152.
125. Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists the
sources of international law as: international conventions (treaties); international
custom (customary international law); general principles of law; and 'judicial deci-
sions and teachings of highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsid-
iary means for the determination of rules of law." Statute of the International
Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187
[hereinafter I.C.J. Statute].
126. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 7-8; see also Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, done May 23, 1969, arts. 11-15, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
335-336 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
127. See Vienna Convention, supra note 126, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
128. See id. art. 26, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 339.
129. See Suzanne M. Bernard, An Eye for an Eye: The Current Status of Inter-
national Law on the Humane Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RuTGERS L.J. 759, 762
(1994); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3, 44 (Feb. 20); I.C.J. Statute, supra note 125, art. 38(1)(b); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. c (1987).
130. See Bernard, supra note 129, at 762.
131. See id.; North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 41-44; RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. d
(1987).
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se.'32 However, it is the generally accepted view that the hu-
man rights principles expressed in the Universal Declaration
have attained the status of customary international law, and
as such are binding on all nations."3 The Universal Declara-
tion gave expression to the human rights principles contained
in the U.N. Charter."' Thus, as an emanation of the U.N.
Charter, the Universal Declaration provides common standards
of conduct for all peoples and all nations."5 As noted in one
report on human rights, "[tihrough practice over the years, the
basic provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
can be regarded as having attained the status of international
customary law and in many instances they have the character
of jus cogens.""' Member states of the United Nations are
bound to abide by the principles contained in the U.N. Charter,
which are more fully expressed in the Universal Declara-
tion." 
7
Many of the principles laid out in the Universal Declara-
tion are contained in subsequent treaties as codification of
existing customary law: "The International Covenants on Hu-
man Rights give added conventional force to those provisions of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which already
reflect international customary law,""8 which is particularly
true for the right against torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment."9 Under international
law, states are bound not only by human rights treaties to
which they are parties, but also by those provisions which have
attained the status of customary international law.
. For alien detainees seeking to challenge their living condi-
tions under this principle, one issue to be addressed is whether
international human rights law, either conventional or custom-
ary, is binding under U.S. domestic law.
132. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 104, at xxiv.
133. See Preliminary Report, supra note 123, at 8; BASSIOUNI, supra note 104,
at xxiv; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 12.
134. Preliminary Report, supra note 123, at 8.
135. See id.
136. See id. Jus cogens, or peremptory norms, are those rules of international
law of such fundamental importance that no derogation from them is permitted.
See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 99, at 270 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 cmt. k (1987)).
137. See Preliminary Report, supra note 123, at 9.
138. Id.
139. See id. at 8; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 12.
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C. International Law and United States Law
Although States are bound by international law, how they
incorporate it into their own law is a matter of domestic policy.
Under the dualist theory of international and national law, the
two systems are viewed as entirely distinct. 4 ' International
law is viewed as a body of law applicable between sovereign
states, while national law is applicable within a state, regulat-
ing the relations of its citizens with the executive power.'
Under the monist theory, international law and national law
are concomitant aspects of one system. " 2 Where conflicts be-
tween the two arise, international law prevails.' A monist
model requires national law to comport with international
law.'
The United States has aspects of both theories. It is mo-
nist in the sense that the U.S. Constitution considers treaties
to be the supreme law of the land,'45 while in practice, a du-
alist model emerges through the doctrine of self-executing trea-
ties-treaties must be implemented by federal legislation in
order to be incorporated into U.S. domestic law. 4 '
1. Treaties in U.S. Law
A treaty accepted by the United States is the supreme law
of the land, of equal status to federal statutes. 7 Where there
is a conflict between a treaty and the Constitution, however,
140. See BURNs H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER
172 (2d ed. 1990) (citing ACADEMY OF SCIENCE OF THE U.S.S.R., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 14-15 (D. Ogden trans., 1961)).
141. See id. at 175 (citing IAN F. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 33-35 (3d ed. 1979)).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 174 (citing Note on Ying Tao, "Recognize the True Face of Bour-
geois International Law from a Few Basic Concepts," in 1 J. COHEN & H. CHIU,
PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-05 (1974)).
145. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
146. See Foster v. Nielsen, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
147. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
290 [Vol. XXIII:I
DETENTION CONDITIONS
the Constitution will prevail. " 8 Where a conffict exists be-
tween a treaty and federal legislation, the last in time pre-
vails.' 9 Where a later federal statute conflicts with an exist-
ing treaty, it is presumed that Congress does not intend to
override the treaty, and courts will construe both so as to give
effect to both. 5 ' However, the "last in time rule" applies only
to self-executing treaties, i.e., those that operate by themselves
and require no implementing legislation. 5'
2. Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties
Courts have developed a doctrine that only self-executing
treaties are judicially enforceable.'52 The doctrine, originated
by Justice Marshall in Foster v. Nielsen, 5' states that a trea-
ty is self-executing and hence "equivalent to an act of the legis-
lature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision."" The effect of this doctrine is that
while the United States is still bound to its treaties under
international law, non-self-executing treaties will not be
deemed to confer a private cause of action and hence, will not
be enforced in a U.S. court.
55
3. Customary International Law in U.S. Law
Since the Supreme Court decided The Paquete Ha-
bana,"'56 it is well-settled that customary international law is
part of U.S. domestic law.'57 The Court in The Paquete Ha-
bana stated:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained
148. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957) (determining that treaties must
comply with the Constitution).
149. See id. at 18; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 115(l)(a) cmt. a (1987).
150. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 99, at 575.
151. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
152. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 99, at 579.
153. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
154. Id.
155. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (Bork, J., concurring).
156. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
157. See Eric George Reeves, Comment, United States v. Javino: Reconsidering
the Relationship of Customary International Law to Domestic Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 877, 877 & n.1 (1993).
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and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations .... "'
The Alien Tort Statute"9 also incorporates international
law into domestic law. It states, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States."6 ' Where there is no treaty at issue,
courts have interpreted "law of nations" to include customary
international law. 6'
There is little controversy that the U.S. Constitution pre-
vails over a conflicting rule of customary international law.'62
However, there is considerable debate whether a federal stat-
ute prevails over a conflicting customary norm, and it is un-
clear whether the "last in time" rule applies in this area.'63
As set forth below, an alien detainee's best argument for
challenging detention conditions would be one grounded in
customary international law.
IV. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS A BASIS FOR
CHALLENGING DETENTION CONDITIONS
The statutory framework of U.S. immigration law, togeth-
er with constitutional jurisprudence involving aliens have, in
effect, left refugees with no legal foundation on which to base a
claim that challenges their conditions of confinement. This
158. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
159. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (resorting to
customary international law in determining whether cause of action exists under
Alien Tort Statute); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1538 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (Forti 1) (using international torts in violation of customary international law
as basis for cause of action under Alien Tort Statute).
162. See Reeves, supra note 157, at 877.
163. See id. Reeves offers a detailed analysis of the relationship of customary
international law to other forms of federal law, and posits that the Second Circuit
is the first federal appeals court to suggest that customary international law may
override a federal statute. See id. at 879 (discussing United States v. Javino, 960
F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1992)).
292 [Vol. )MII
DETENTION CONDITIONS
note argues that international human rights law-specifically
the principle prohibiting cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment-provides the only meaningful substantive basis for
refugees in challenging their detention conditions.
A. The Failure of U.S. Law to Respond
Jurisprudence in the United States has left refugees with
little, if any, constitutional protection against inhumane deten-
tion conditions. This limited protection is due, in part, to
refugees' classification as "excludable" under U.S. immigration
law, but mainly, as posited by Professor Margaret Taylor, to
the "plenary power doctrine" adopted by courts in giving ex-
treme deference to the other governmental branches in immi-
gration matters."
Detainees in immigration jails can be classified under two
categories: "excludable" and "deportable" aliens. An alien is
excludable under the INA if she or he has not made an actual
entry into the United States.16 Refugees seeking to enter the
United States for the first time fall into the excludable catego-
ry of aliens.'66 Aliens who are apprehended at U.S. borders,
such as a refugee arriving at an airport, have not technically
"entered" the country, even though they are on U.S. soil and
are physically detained within U.S. borders under custody of
the INS."7 Deportable aliens, on the other hand, are those
who have already entered the United States, either by permis-
sion or through illegal means. 66 A lawfully admitted alien is
subject to deportation for reasons set forth in the INA, such as
164. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 1127. While several provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, i.e., the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, seemingly pro-
vide the substantive basis necessary for challenging detention conditions, jurispru-
dence in the alien context has effectively redefined the substantive law to limit
the protections available to excludable aliens. See id. at 1127-57.
165. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1994).
166. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 1095.
167. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 188 (1988) (detention of aliens
in custody pending determination of their admissibility does not constitute legal
entry, despite their physical presence within the United States); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953) (excludable aliens are treat-
ed "as if stopped at the border" even when they are paroled or confined within
the United States).
168. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957, 961 n.1 (11th Cir.
1984).
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criminal conduct.'69 Those who have entered or remain in the
United States illegally are also subject to deportation.7 '
The distinction is significant in the immigration context,
as deportable aliens generally enjoy a broader framework of
procedural safeguards than those available to excludable aliens
with respect to their status, their deportability, and their
length of detention. 7' Moreover, deportable aliens have
greater constitutional protections than excludable aliens.7 2
In fact, it has been asserted that excludable aliens, because
they have not "entered" the United States, are "constructively
outside the Constitution's jurisdictional reach."'73 The irony
behind this framework is that those who have presented them-
selves to immigration officials upon arrival are afforded less
protection than those who have surreptitiously crossed the
border. However, deportable and excludable aliens are alike in
two respects. First, as noted by Professor Taylor, they are not
subject to penal incarceration.74 Although deportable aliens
are not typically detained unless they are awaiting deportation
for criminal conduct,'75 their detention occurs after they have
served their sentences. They are not charged with a crime
while detained for purposes of deportation.'76  Likewise,
excludable aliens are not charged with a crime. Their only
"offense" is arriving at U.S. borders without valid documenta-
tion."'77 Second, deportable and excludable aliens share one
classification for international human rights purposes: they are
human beings. As such, they -are entitled to respect for the
169. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a); Taylor, supra note 45, at 1096.
170. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252; Taylor, supra note 45, at 1096.
171. For example, detained deportable aliens may petition an immigration judge
to redetermine their custody status; must be released after six months of a final
deportation order, and may claim procedural due process protection. See Taylor,
supra note 45, at 1097.
172. See id.
173. Kemple, supra note 11, at 1756; see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel.
Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 215 (1953). With respect to detention itself, the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits have adopted the position that excludable aliens have no consti-
tutional rights whatsoever regarding their detention. See Kemple, supra note 11,
at 1742-43; Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982); Garcia-Mir v.
Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1447-48 (11th Cir. 1986).
174. Taylor, supra note 45, at 1098.
175. See id. at 1097.
176. See id. at 1098 n.59.
177. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(20) (1994).
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"inherent dignity and worth of the human person." "'
The limited rights of aliens due to their excludable status
are augmented by the adoption by U.S. courts of the plenary
power doctrine, which has "silently and improperly infiltrated
some cases adjudicating the conditions claims of aliens in im-
migration detention,"179 resulting in a "realm where the Con-
stitution does not always apply."8 ' The basic premise of this
doctrine is that the congressional and executive branches
should be given extreme deference in their authority over im-
migration matters. 8 ' Professor Taylor suggests that this doc-
trine, rooted in the "racist backlash against Chinese laborers"
in the nineteenth century, continues to permeate immigration
law, despite remarkable strides in constitutional law through-
out the twentieth century.'82
In the 1950s the Supreme Court denied due process to
aliens who were excluded by the Attorney General without a
hearing.'83 In both cases, the court held that "'[w]hatever the
procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as
an alien denied entry is concerned. '"' Although the primary
issue in these cases was whether an excludable alien possessed
due process rights with respect to the decision to admit or
exclude the alien, the broad language of these holdings has
tended to be applied to the issue of detention itself.8 ' In
Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, the Eleventh Circuit stated that
continued incarceration of excludable aliens does not deprive
them of a liberty interest because they have no right to admis-
sion in the first place.'88 The Fourth Circuit adopted this rea-
•soning, holding that excludable aliens can be detained indefi-
nitely as part of the exclusion process.87 Indeed, as noted by
Professor Taylor, the broad language in Knauff and Mezei has
178. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
179. Taylor, supra note 45, at 1127.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 1128.
182. Id. at 1129.
183. See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-44
(1950); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212, 215 (1953).
184. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 212 (quoting Knauff, 338 U.S. at 544).
185. One commentator suggested that "the caging of aliens within U.S. prisons
is viewed as part and parcel of an application for admission, with the resulting
infliction of human suffering abstracted away." Kemple, supra note 11, at 1756.
186. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 734 F.2d 576, 582 (1ith Cir. 1984).
187. See Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1982).
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"opened the door for government officials to argue that
excludable aliens in their custody 'possess no constitutional
rights' to challenge abusive treatment or inhumane detention
conditions.""s
Other courts have limited the scope of the plenary power
doctrine. In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the Attorney General lacked the authority to
detain excludable aliens beyond "a reasonable period of negoti-
ations for their return to the country of origin."'89 After that
period, such aliens are entitled to release. 9 ' This reasoning
was adopted by the First Circuit in Amanullah v. Nelson.'9'
Beyond the issue of detention itself, recent cases have limited
the scope of the plenary power doctrine and have afforded
excludable aliens constitutional protection to challenge the
conditions of their confinement.'92 Jean v. Nelson,'93 a class
action case involving Haitian refugees, added strength to the
plenary power doctrine, 94 but it also recognized that aliens
"can raise constitutional challenges.., outside the context of
entry or admission, when the plenary authority of the political
branches is not implicated."195 Surely one would be hard
pressed in arguing that the inhumane treatment of alien
detainees is entitled to deferential treatment by the judicia-
ry.- '96 Indeed, the "boundary of the plenary power doctrine"
proffered by Professor Taylor was defined in Lynch v.
Cannatella,97 a Fifth Circuit case involving excludable aliens
who claimed severe mistreatment while in custody. Recogniz-
ing that excludable aliens had limited constitutional rights
with respect to immigration matters, the Fifth Circuit never-
theless concluded that the precedent of the plenary power
188. Taylor, supra note 45, at 1132.
189. Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1981).
190. See id. at 1390.
191. 811 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1987).
192. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 1143.
193. 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
194. See id. at 984 (finding that excludable aliens cannot make equal protection
challenges to the decisions of executive officials with regard to their applications
for admission, asylum, or parole).
195. Id. at 972.
196. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 1132 nn.231-32 (citing cases that have recog-
nized, in dicta or dissenting opinions, the outer limits of the plenary power doc-
trine as applied to conditions of confinement).
197. 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1987).
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doctrine "does not limit the right of excludable aliens detained
within United States territory to humane treatment."98
While simultaneously recognizing the underlying premise of
the plenary power doctrine as a matter of sovereignty and self-
determination,'99 the Fifth Circuit noted that sovereignty
concerns are not threatened by entitling aliens to challenge
their confinement conditions. The court stated that "we cannot
conceive of any national interests that would justify the mali-
cious infliction of cruel treatment on a person in United States
territory simply because that person is an excludable
alien."' ° The court held, therefore, that "whatever due pro-
cess rights excludable aliens may be denied by virtue of their
status, they are entitled under the due process clauses of the
fifth and fourteenth amendments to be free of gross physical
abuse at the hands of state or federal officials."2'
For alien detainees subject to cruel and inhuman treat-
ment, Lynch provided a glimmer of hope. Unfortunately, subse-
quent cases have undermined Lynch's promise by turning the
language that condemned the actions of the defendants into a
legal standard of proof. In order to state a viable due process
claim, courts have required excludable aliens to show "mali-
cious infliction of cruel treatment" or "gross physical
abuse," 2 a threshold higher than what is required for pretri-
al detainees and convicted prisoners.0 ' Thus, a standard re-
jected as too stringent by the Supreme Court for convicted
prisoners challenging prison conditions under the Eighth
Amendment2 4 leaves alien detainees with virtually no pro-
tection against inhumane treatment.
B. The Role of International Human Rights Law
As was stated in a report to the Economic and Security
Council's Commission on Human Rights:
It is well established that all individuals are endowed with
basic human rights which are inherent attributes of human
198. Id. at 1373; see Taylor, supra note 45, at 1145.
199. Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1373.
200. Id. at 1374.
201. Id.; see Taylor, supra note 45, at 1145.
202. See Taylor, supra note 45, at 1147-50.
203. See id. at 1151.
204. See id. at 1152-54.
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dignity and which are recognized by virtue of international
law that both recognizes and protects them. States, in turn,
are obliged to ensure respect for those universally recognized
human rights which are essential to the survival, dignity and
well-being of all persons subject to their jurisdiction.0
Alien detainees should consider invoking international
human rights law in challenging their detention conditions.
Substantively the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment may rekindle the glimmer of hope bestowed
upon excludable aliens by Lynch-that regardless of status, a
person under U.S. jurisdiction is entitled to humane treatment.
Unfortunately, U.S. courts have been reluctant to enforce in-
ternational law, claiming that it belongs in the area of foreign
policy, which is the prerogative of the executive and legislative
branches.0 As a matter of comity, U.S. courts are reluctant
to evaluate the legitimacy of actions undertaken by other na-
tions0. lest a foreign nation sit in judgment of the U.S. gov-
ernment. Additionally, international law has traditionally been
viewed as involving disputes between sovereign states, not
individuals. With the development of human rights law, how-
ever, there is little question that the individual is an appropri-
ate party to a dispute arising under international law. 8
This part discusses the substantive provisions available to
detainees in challenging their conditions of confinement, and
suggests that U.S. courts directly incorporate these norms into
domestic law, lest the promise of Lynch be lost forever.
205. Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis M. Deng,
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/57, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 51st Sess., Prov. Agenda Item 9(d), at 6, U.N.
Doc. EICN.411996/52/Add.2 (1995) [hereinafter Deng Report].
206. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(per curiam) (Bork, J., concurring) (invoking political question doctrine as basis for
refusing jurisdiction under international law claim); Lea Brilmayer, International
Law in American Courts: A Modest Proposal, 100 YALE L.J. 2277, 2281-83 (1991).
207. See Brilmayer, supra note 206, at 2281-82.
208. See BASSIOUNI, supra note 104, at xxiv. The author notes that:
These provisions [of the U.N. Charter] unequivocally assert the existence,
primacy and direct applicability of internationally protected human rights
in those national legal systems that have ratified the Charter, irrespec-
tive of traditional claims of sovereignty. Thus, these provisions have put





The Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Conven-
tion). 9 and the ICCPR21° are two treaties that are applica-
ble to the detention facility conditions; both treaties have been
signed and ratified by the United States. The Torture Conven-
tion specifically deals with the prevention and punishment of
acts of torture or other "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Although the convention primarily focuses on
torture, those provisions specifically dealing with torture are
also applicable to "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."21' Acts prohibited by the conven-
tion are limited to acts "committed by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity."212 Accordingly, the vic-
tims of such acts must be understood as persons "deprived of
their liberty" or persons "who are otherwise under the factual
power or control of the person responsible for the treatment or
punishment."21 The INS, as an arm of the U.S. Department
of Justice, would qualify as a "public official or other person
acting in official capacity."
The ICCPR confers a wide degree of individual human
rights, among them the freedom from "torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." contained in
article 7.214 The Human Rights Committee215 stated that
the principal purpose of article 7 is to "protect the integrity
209. Torture Convention, supra note 13, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, at 19, 23
I.L.M. at 1027.
210. ICCPR, supra note 13, SEN. ExEc. Doc. E, 95-2, at 23, 999 U.N.T.S. at
171.
211. Article 16(1) states: "[Tihe obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and
13 shall apply with the substitution for references to torture or references to other
forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Torture Conven-
tion, supra note 13, art. 16(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 23, 23 I.L.M. at
1031.
212. Id., arts. 1, 16(1), S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20, at 19, 23; see BURGERS &
DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 20, 149.
213. See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 101, at 149.
214. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7, SEN. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999
U.N.T.S. at 175.
215. The Human Rights Committee is the body established under the ICCPR to
monitor implementation of the Covenant's provisions. See id. art. 28, SEN. EXEC.
Doc. E, 95-2, at 31, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
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and dignity of the individual."216 For all persons deprived of
their liberty, "article 7 is supplemented by the positive require-
ment of article 10(1)... that they shall be treated with hu-
manity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person."21 The Human Rights Committee has stressed that
"States parties should ensure that the principle stated [in
article 10(1)] is observed in all institutions and establishments
within their jurisdiction where persons are being held,"218
and that "[tlreating all persons deprived of their liberty with
humanity and with respect for their dignity is a fundamental
and universally applicable rule."219
As U.S. treaties, these instruments have the status of the
"supreme Law of the Land" under the Constitution,20 except
that the United States, in ratifying the treaties, made specific
declarations that they shall not be self-executing.2 1 Since
Congress has made its intent clear, it is certain that the courts
will not enforce these treaties in a domestic action. Neverthe-
less, the United States is bound under international law to
adhere to the obligations imposed on it by these treaties. To
that end, the United States is required, at a minimum, to
refrain from continuing its inhumane practices with respect to
detainees.
Treaties, however, are not the only source of international
law. Other sources are available, specifically customary inter-
national law, upon which to base a claim against detention
conditions.
216. Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Comment No, 7, U.N.
GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/37/40
(1982).
217. Id. at 95.
218. Deng Report, supra note 205, at 33.
219. Id.
220. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2.
221. See MULTILATERAL TREATIES DEPOSITED WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL,
STATUS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1995, at 187, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E1/14, U.N. Sales
No. E.96.V.5 (1996) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES] (declaration of United
States that provisions 1 through 16 of the Torture Convention are not self-execut-
ing); id. at 130 (declaration of United States that provisions 1 through 27 of the
ICCPR are not self-executing).
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2. Customary International Law
Customary law is a source of international law.222 As
stated earlier,2  customary international law is part of U.S.
law. In The Paquete Habana stated that "[jinternational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by
the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as
questions of right depending on it are duly presented for their
determination."2 ' The principles espoused by the Torture
Convention and the ICCPR are codifications of already-existing
customary law.22 Thus, as a matter of customary law, the
prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
should serve as a basis for enforcement of detention conditions
through The Paquete Habana vehicle. However, the rule estab-
lished under that case was modified by dictum indicating that
before a claim based on custom would be entertained, there
must be an absence of a treaty or controlling executive or legis-
lative act.226 Some scholars argue that this dictum compels
courts to apply domestic law over international custom, while
others argue the primacy of customary lawY.2 7 Nevertheless,
it can be argued that neither a "controlling executive or legisla-
tive act" nor a treaty exists that would prevent the application
of customary law in the detention condition context.
Although the detention of excludable aliens is clearly with-
in the realm of the executive and legislative branches,228 the
mistreatment of detainees cannot plausibly be considered as
the controlling executive or legislative act that bars the appli-
cation of customary law. With respect to treaties, despite the
fact that the United States signed and ratified the Torture
Convention and the ICCPR, the United States' declarations
that those treaties are not self-executing might serve as an
argument that no treaty exists. If the court is prohibited, by
virtue of the declarations, from relying on a treaty, it is as if
no treaty exists.
222. See I.C.J. Statute, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055, 1060, 3 Bevans 1179, 1187.
223. See supra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
224. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
225. See supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 237-45
and accompanying text.
226. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
227. See Reeves, supra note 157, at 885-86.
228. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
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Additionally, a reservation to the ICCPR serves as evi-
dence that no applicable treaty exists. In its ratification to the
ICCPR, the United States announced a reservation to article 7,
stating:
[The United States considers itself bound by article 7 to the
extent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment' means the cruel and unusual treatment or pun-
ishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.229
This reservation makes the treaty inapplicable because the
U.S. Constitution itself is inapplicable to conditions in immi-
gration detention centers for a number of reasons. First,
excludable aliens have virtually no due process rights, as ex-
plained earlier. Second, the Eighth Amendment proscribes
cruel and unusual punishment, whereas the ICCPR proscribes
cruel, inhuman or other degrading treatment or punishment.
The alien detainees are not in penal situations, and are not
charged with a crime. Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has
held: "[tihe Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and
unusual 'conditions'; it outlaws cruel and unusual 'punish-
ments.'""'
Because of the non-self-executing status of the Torture
Convention and the ICCPR, and because of the limiting reser-
vation to article 7 of the ICCPR, there is no treaty on which a
court may rely in ascertaining and administering international
law. Accordingly, "resort must be had to the customs and usag-
es of civilized nations.""3 In order to invoke customary inter-
national law, however, it must first be established that "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment" has been recognized as a
customary norm.
In determining whether a rule has achieved the status of a
customary norm, judges rely on the Supreme Court's enumera-
tion of the sources of international law:" "[T]he law of na-
tions... may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists,
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and
practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and
229. MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 221, at 130.
230. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (emphasis added).
231. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
232. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 99, at 596.
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enforcing that law."233 Courts will determine whether a stan-
dard has ripened into a "settled rule of international law"234
by interpreting international law as it has "evolved and exists
among the nations of the world today."
2 35
The Second Circuit in Filartiga has held that official tor-
ture violates international law. 6 That court concluded:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in numerous
international agreements, and the renunciation of torture as
an instrument of official policy by virtually all of the nations
of the world (in principle if not in practice), we find that an
act of torture committed by a state official against one held
in detention violates established norms of the international
law of human rights, and hence the law of nations."
In determining that the proscription against torture was an
established customary norm, the Filartiga court relied on the
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration: "This prohibition
has become part of customary international law, as evidenced
and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights .... 13' The court also relied on the international con-
sensus condemning torture as evidenced in numerous interna-
tional treaties and accords." 9 The prohibition against "other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" was
not at issue in Filartiga, and thus, the court did not address
whether that prohibition is a customary norm. However, ac-
cording to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law,
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment is recognized as a rule of customary international
law.
240
One court, in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, did address the issue
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and found that the
plaintiff had failed to establish "the requisite degree of interna-
tional consensus which demonstrates a customary internation-
233. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
234. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694.
235. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
236. See id. at 884.
237. Id. at 880.
238. Id. at 882.
239. Id. at 882.
240. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702(d) (1987).
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al norm""' with respect to his claims. The court further held
that the norm lacks definability and readily ascertainable
parameters. 2 On a motion to reconsider, the plaintiff pre-
sented evidence of numerous international instruments pro-
scribing "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment," the very
same instruments that contain the proscription against tor-
ture. 3 Nonetheless, the court was concerned with the lack of
clear definition of the term in all the instruments. Conceding
that the rule had achieved the status of a customary norm, the
court ruled that it must be characterized by universal consen-
sus in the international community, not only as to its status,
but also as to its content, and dismissed the allegation."
Courts should be wary in adopting the Forti court's rea-
soning with respect to the definability prong of determining a
customary norm. Such reasoning ignores the purpose of the
norm against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment-to pro-
tect the integrity and dignity of the individual-and opens the
door for the same type of substantive manipulation that
quelled the promise under Lynch. The Forti court is correct in
conceding that "cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment" has
achieved the status of customary international law. In fact, the
standard sits side by side with the prohibition against torture
in all the major international instruments: i.e., "no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment."' 5 A court adopting the Filartiga meth-
odology is unlikely to refute the existence of "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment" as a customary international norm. How-
ever, the Forti court was mistaken in denying its existence as
a customary norm for lack of definability.
241. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
242. See id.
243. See Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Forti
II).
244. See id. at 712.
245. Universal Declaration, supra note 12, art. 5; ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 7,
SEN. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 25, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175; European Convention, supra
note 13, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224; American Convention, supra note 13, art.
5(2), SEN. ExEc. Doc. F, 95-2, at 42, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 146; Banjul Charter,
supra note 115, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 60. The Torture Convention specifically applies
those provisions against torture to other "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Torture Convention, supra note 13, art. 16(1), S. TREATY Doc. No.
100-20, at 23, 23 I.L.M. at 1031.
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None of the international instruments noted above 6 de-
fine "torture," yet the Filartiga and Forti courts had little diffi-
culty in holding that its proscription was a customary interna-
tional norm. In fact, the first formal definition of torture was
produced in the Torture Convention, adopted four years after
Filartiga was decided. 7 The same should hold true for the
prohibition against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment,"
since that prohibition appears in the same sentence as "tor-
ture" in all the major conventions. Moreover, the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which prohibits cruel or
unusual punishment, is undefined, vague and lacks consensus,
yet courts have entertained claims based upon the Eighth
Amendment since its inception. While there has been some
difficulty in precisely defining "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment" in the human rights field, a fact-based analysis to
the definition seems to have emerged.
For example, the ICCPR requires treatment "with humani-
ty and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son.""' The Human Rights Committee noted that the ICCPR
does not contain any definition of the concepts covered by arti-
cle 7,"9 but it did not'consider it necessary "to establish
sharp distinctions between the different kinds of punishment
or treatment; the distinctions depend on the nature, purpose
and severity of the treatment applied."' 0 The Committee
stated, however, that the prohibition in article 7 relates "not
only to acts that cause physical pain but also to acts that cause
mental suffering to the victim.""' For all people deprived of
their liberty, article 7 is to be read in conjunction with article
10, requiring treatment with humanity and with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human personY
The European Court of Human Rights, in interpreting the
246. See generally those instruments cited in footnote 122.
247. See generally Torture Convention, supra note 13, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-
20, at 23, 23 I.L.M. at 1027.
248. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 10(1), SEN. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2, at 26, 999
U.N.T.S. at 176.
249. See Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 20,
U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., at 1, 2, U.N. Doc.
CCPRIC/21/Rev.I/Add.3 (1992).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 2.
252. See id. at 1.
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scope of article 3 of the European Convention, made a distinc-
tion between the concepts of "torture" and "inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment," stating that the distinction comes principally
from the different intensity of suffering inflicted.253 The court
emphasized that the assessment of ill treatment is relative,
depending on "all the circumstances of the case, such as the
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in
some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim,
etc."' "Inhuman" treatment was considered by the court to
be anything that causes "if not actual bodily injury, at least in-
tense physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected
thereto."255 "Degrading" treatment was considered to be
treatment that "arouse[s] in ... victims feelings of fear, an-
guish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them
and possibly breaking down their physical or moral
resistance."256 "Torture" constitutes an "aggravated and delib-
erate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment." 7
In a case involving corporal punishment,25 the European
Court of Human Rights determined that judicial corporate
punishment was "degrading" because:
although the [victim] did not suffer any severe or long-lasting
physical effects, his punishment-whereby he was treated as
an object in the power of the authorities-constituted an
assault on precisely that which is one of the main purposes of
Article 3 to protect, namely a person's dignity and physical
integrity.-9  /
Finally, the Draft International Human Rights Conformity Act
of 1993,26 which conforms U.S. law to the requirements of
the ICCPR, states that cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
253. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67 (1978).
254. Id. at 65.
255. Id. at 66.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 67.
258. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1978) (challeng-
ing the sentencing of a 15-year old boy to three strokes of a birch).
259. Id. at 16.
260. Draft International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993, reprinted in
Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Con-
formity Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1228 (1993).
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or punishment "shall be given such content and definition by
the courts of the United States as provided for by recognized
authorities under governing principles of international law,
and should depend on the kind, purpose, and severity of the
particular treatment." '6
V. CONCLUSION
The current definitions of the norm make it clear that
cases invoking "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" will be
decided on a case-by-case basis. This type of analysis may be
the key to successfully advancing a case. The first step in at-
tempting a definition is quite simple: that individuals are enti-
tled to respect for their human dignity. As with any type of
law, the norm is subject to interpretation and change over
time. That uncertainty in itself should not discourage the judi-
ciary from hearing claims invoking the standard as an estab-
lished rule of customary international law. As stated by Judge
Rogers in Fernandez v. Wilkinson, "No country in the world
has been more vocal in favor of human rights [than the United
States]. It would not befit our history as a guarantor of human
rights for our own citizens, to decline to protect unadmitted
aliens against arbitrary governmental infringement of their
fundamental human rights."262
The norm has clearly achieved the status of customary
international law, and U.S. courts should agree to entertain
claims based upon the norm on that basis alone. As stated in
Filartiga, new norms must be applied as they emerge and
evolve.263 One common element emerging from the interna-
tional instruments on human rights and the adjudication of
human rights norms is the protection of a person's inherent
dignity. Although it may seem to be a rule without teeth, it
will get some teeth when judges allow it to bite.
Barbara MacGrady
261. Draft International Human Rights Conformity Act of 1993 § 105(c), re-
printed in Posner & Spiro, supra note 260, at 1230.
262. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 799 (D. Kan. 1980); see Louis
B. Sohn, Can International Law Provide Extra-Constitutional Protection for
Excludable Aliens?, 21 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 329, 344 (1991).
263. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
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